Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 13

Issue 1

Article 6

1924

Case Comments
Kentucky Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Kentucky Law Journal (1924) "Case Comments," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol13/iss1/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

CASE COMMENTS
BOUNDAIIEF-ADVERSE POSSESSIo-EvZNCE.--Action to quiet title
to a tract of land. The land was in the shape of a bow, a ridge separating the waters of Mud Lick Branch from Sand Lick Branch before they
each enter into Pond Creek. On July 8, 1850, one Hunt obtained a
patent to land on the Mud Lick side, and on June 11, 1860, one McCoy
obtained a similar patent on the ,Sand Lick side. Plaintiff claims the
land is part of the Hunt patent and the only point in dispute is the
following description: "Thence running up said ridge S. 500 east 157
poles to 3 chestnut oaks on a bench." Plaintiff contends that the call or
line in dispute should be run around the top of the ridge, that he has
title by adverse possession, and that the statement of defendant's
vendor after he parted with the title that if he owned any land on the
Mud Lick side he did not know it, was admissible.
In the absence of some controlling indication to the contrary when
a description of boundaries of land calls for a line from one monument
to another a straight line is intended. Baker v. Talbott, 6 T. B. Monroe
179; Crutcherv. Shelby Railroad District,3 Ky. Law Rep. 533; Haskell
v. Friend, 196 Mass. 198. Lines should never be deflected except to conform to the intention of the parties. Carterv. Elk Coal Co., 176 Ky. 378.
The only evidence of adverse possession was the occasional cutting
of timber by the immediate vendee of Hunt. One may not acquire
title by adverse possession except to the extent of his boundaries unless
he takes actual possession beyond the boundaries. Terry v. Loudermilk,
153 Ky. 353; Combs v. Stacy, 147 Ky. 222.
Kentucky follows the general rule in holding that the statements
of a grantor after he has parted with title are inadmissible. Aylor v.
Aylor, 158 Ky. 713; Bennett Jellico Coal Co. v. East Jellico Coal Co., 152
J. H.
Ky. 338; Vrarney & Wife v. Orinoco Mining Co., 201 Ky. 571.
ACTION OF EJECTMEcNT-ADVERSE PossEssioN.--Plaintiff claims title
by adverse possession. When the defendant took possession the land
was vacant and unoccupied. Plaintiff's ancestor lived in the neighborhood of the land in question and for many years previous to his death
had gone upon the land and cut timber. These occasional trespasses
on the land were his only acts of ownership. He paid the taxes on the
land until his death in 1911, and after his death and until 1919 his
widow and heirs cut timber and paid the taxes.
It is the general rule that in order to acquire title by adverse possession the adverse holding must be exclusive, continuous, and uninterrupted for the statutory period; the adverse holder must, as some
of the opinions express it, "keep his flag flying." Asher v. Pace, 198
Ky. 285; Young v. Pace, 145 Ky. 405. As a necessary corollary of this
principle it is well established that occasional acts of trespassing by
cutting timber is not such a continuous occupancy as will eventually
ripen into a possessory title. Muse v. Payne, 144 Ky. 30; Stearns and
Lumber Co. v. Buyatt, 168 Ky. 111; Bibb v. Daniels, 183 Ky. 659.
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In some jurisdictions it has been provided by statute that an enclosed tract of land shall be deemed possessed when it has been used
for the supply of fuel or fencing timber for the purpose of husbandry or
the ordinary use of the occupant. Murphy v. Dofoe, IS S. D. 42; Pittman v. Hill, 117 Wis. 318; Adams v. Clapp, 36 Baine 316. It should be
noticed that these statutes are not applicable when the timber has
been cut for general sale. DuPont v. Davis, 35 Wis. 631.
Payment of taxes does not itself amount to sufficient possession as
will start the running of the statute. Overton v. Overton, 123 Ky. 311;
ConsolidatedIce Co. v. New York, 166 N. Y. 92; Whitnan v. Shaw, 166
Mass. 451.
In Kypodel Coal & Lumber Company, 165 Ky. 432, defendant
bought the land at a sheriff's sale and took a tax deed therefor which
was void. He never went into possession but paid the taxes. It was
held that the payment of the taxes was not sufficient evidence of possession to start the statute running.
In some jurisdictions evidence of payment of taxes is inadmissible
on behalf of the adverse holder. Whitman v. Shaw, 166 Mass. 451;
Stevens v. Rhinelander, 23 N. Y. Super. 285. Other states, while regarding it as evidence entitled to little credit, admit it as a circumstance to show possession. Dickinson v. Boles, 59 Kan. 224; Sauer v.
Giddings, 90 Mich. 50; Draper v. Shoot, 25 Mo. 197. The latter ruling
represents the weight of American authority on the question and seems
to be sounder in theory and practice.
In 157 Ky. 530, in addition to the payment of taxes, timber was
cut and sold. it was held that there was not sufficient evidence of possession to satisfy the requirements of actual possession.
However it has been held that payment of taxes in connection with
the best and most practicable use of the soil to which it is adapted constitutes actual possession. Wheeler v. Gorman, 80 Minn. 42.
In Kelsey v. Murray, 9 Watts (Pa.) IlI, plaintiff paid all the taxes
for 30 years and defendant refused to have the land assessed in his
name. It was held that plaintiff had the better title.
Kentucky follows the general rule in holding that payment of
taxes and occasional acts of trespassing by cutting timber are not
sufficient of themselves to satisfy the requirements of adverse possession.
In ejectment the plaintiff must either trace a paper title back to
the Commonwealth, or show a possessory title in himself or his vendees
for the statutory period. Logan v. William., 160 Ky. 641; Stephens v.
Stephens, 165 Ky. 353. He must recover on the strength of his own title
and not on the weakness of the defendant's. Read v. Fletcher, 170 Ky.
498; Lee v. Pittman, 173 Ky. 761. Kentucky follows the general rule
on this point. Fitzgerald v. Aldridge, 201 Ky. 846.
J. H.
VENDOR AND PuRoCAsEa-LAiLITY OF VENDORS FOR DEFicmsNcy IN
QUANTiTY Or' LAND SOLD TO A SECOND PuncnTASER-SAI.I BY ACRE oR IN

Guoss.-Lands consisting of several contiguous tracts were executed
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by deed to a real estate agent and described by the vendor as 345
acres, more or less. Of this the agent sold 2 tracts, one 78 acres and
the other 80 acres. The remainder was sold to F. and described in
the deed as 185 acres, more or less. After this transaction the agent
paid his vendor the balance of his indebtedness to him and was relieved from all liability. F. being put in possession of his respective
boundary, had it surveyed and discovered a shortage of 45 acres. He
thereupon sued the agent and the agent's vendor for the deficit. Judgment was rendered against both defendants. Held, that each grantor
was liable to his grantee for the deficit in describing the land. Therefore the plaintiff obtained relief from both grantors as it was proper
to settle all the controversy in one case and avoid circuity of action.
Upon appeal the decision of the lower court was affirmed.
A purchaser of land suing for a deficit may join his grantors as
a party in order to avoid circuity of action. Crane v. Prather,et al., 4
J. 3. Marsh (27 Ky.) 75. When there is a deficit of more than ten per
cent in the quantity described in the deed, there is relief even if the
sale is in gross. Hunter v. Keightley, 148 Ky. 835, 213 S. W. 201. In a
deed the words "more or less" are often added to the number of acres
described therein. This is only a relief from the nceessity of exactness, and not from gross deficiency. Boggs v. Bush, 137 Ky. 95, 122 S.
W. 22; Rust v. Carpenter,153 Ky. 672, 166 S. W. 180; Lassiter v. Farris,
A. T.
202 Ky. 330.
WILUs-LirATTio oF ABSOLUTE ESTATE BY SUBSEQUENT LAiGuAG.
-The testator, by his will, gave to his wife, "all my property, both
real and personal estate," and provided that "at the death of my wife,
all property belonging to her shall be equally divided between my heirs,
as follows," etc. The appellee in the instant case, was the devisee of
this property mentioned in the will and brought this action for specific
performance of a contract entered into by her and the appellant and
by which the latter agreed to purchase a certain tract of land of the
former. This particular property was one of those devised to the appellee, and appellant refused to buy it because the will gave to the appellee merely a life estate in the property with remainder to testator's
children and not a fee simple.
The primary rule in interpreting a will is to ascertain the intention of the testator from the language employed in the entire testamentary instrument, and to construe it accordingly, unless to so do
would contravene some positive rule of law or public policy. 40 Cyc.,
p. 1386; Patrick v. Patrick, 135 Ky. 307; Lydon v. Campbell, 204 Mass.
580. An absolute estate, therefore, given in the clause of a will, may be
limited by a subsequent clause which indicates that the testator intended to make such a restriction upon the estate. However, if the
limitation is restricted to such property devised as the taker of the
absolute estate may leave or not dispose of, the limitation is void because of its repugnancy to the absolute gift. 40 Cyc., p. 1587; Colt v.
Heard, 10 N. Y. 189; Foster v. Smith, 156 Mass. 379. It follows that in
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fathoming the intention of the testator in the present case, as shown
in the will, it is to determine whether he intended his heirs to divide
among themselves at the death of his wife, the remainder of an absolute
estate given to her, or wished them to secure all the estate granted to
the wife, after she had enjoyed it during her lifetime. In the former
case, the wife has a fee simple in the estate granted to her; if the
latter intention prevails, she has only a life estate in the property.
The words employed in the will,, clearly show that the devise made
was unqualified and absolute, and such being its character, it invested
the wife with a fee simple title to the property, and by implication also
gave her power to sell or otherwise dispose of it. The subsequent laflguage in the will, calling for a division of the property dt her death,
does not indicate that the testator intended to limit the fee previously
given, but more reasonably conveys the meaning that such of the
property as the wife failed to dispose of during her life or as should
remain at her death should go to the testator's children as directed by
the will. The instrument considered in toto nowhere indicates that the
testator intended to place any restriction on the wife's power to dispose
of the property. Recent cases in this jurisdiction that have produced
facts of a similar nature support such a construction placed upon the
present will. Plagenborgv. Molendyk, 187 Ky. 509; Linder v. L7ewellen's
Adrnr., et a7., 190 Ky. 388; Greenway v. White, 196 Ky. 750. In the case
first mentioned the testator gave to his wife all of his remaining estate
after the payment of his debts, and after her death, "any remaining
-estate, both real and personal, shall be given to my children." The
wife was held to have taken a fee and the limitation over of what
remained was void. In the second named case, the wife of a testator
was given an absolute devise by a will which gave all his property to
her, with the remainder at her death to be divided among other relatives.
The court in determining the instant will as passing a fee simple
title has liberally and reasonably followed previous cases that have
firmly established this theory and has likewise voiced the public policy
of the state in regard to this problem as evidenced by section 2342 of
the Kentucky Statutes, which provides: "Unless a different purpose
appear by express words or necessary inference, every estate in land
crated by deed or will without words of inheritance, shall be deemed
a fee simple'or such other estate as the grantor or testator had power
to dispose of." Snyder, et al.v. Snider, et a7., 202 Ky. 321.
M. l.
Hom~ciE-AGGIESEI-WHO RENEWED C0ommAT--A QUESTON Fon
THE JuRY.-As they were returning from church, two young men en-

gaged in a friendly scuffle, which soon developed into a fight. Defendant got the worst of the fight and went to his home and secured a revolver. He returned to the fray and shot and killed his opponent who
tried to escape by hiding behind a rock. The jury found the defendant
guilty of murder and fixed his punishment at life imprisonment. The
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Court of Appeals was asked to set the verdict aside upon the grounds
of excessive punishment.
An aggressor can not plead self-defense where the difficulty results in a killing. In such a case the defendant is guilty of murder or
manslaughter. This is the general rule which is followed in Kentucky;
21 Cyc. 805; Odor v. Commonwealth, S0 Ky. 82; Taber v. Commonwealth, 82 S. W. 443, and Blankcnship v. Commonwealth, 66 S. W. 944.
Where the original difficulty has ceased and the party has opportunity of declining further combat and he renews the difficulty or continues the struggle he becomes the aggressor; 21 Cyc. 805.
The defendant in the case under consideration, by returning to the
fray, became the aggressor and his plea of self-defense could not be
sustained. There was evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding,
and their verdict was not of such a nature as to evidence passion and
prejudice. The findings of fact by a jury are not subject to the review
of the appellate court, whose jurisdiction is confined to questions of
law arising upon the record. 3 Cyc. 348; Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S.
436. If there is any evidence legally sufficient to sustain the verdict
of a jury it will not be disturbed. Sharpe v. MoReary, 20 Ky. Law Report 911; A7ley v. Hopkins, 19 Ky. Law Report 1515. The rule in Kentucky as laid down by the principal case is that the appellate court
will not set aside the verdict of a jury because punishment is severe,
where there is no evidence of passion or prejudice on the part of the
jury. Polly v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 740.
E. R. J.
GRAwD JURY-INDICTMENT FOUND AND RETURNED IN ABSENcE or JuDGE

Voim.-Nine of eleven indictments returned against one M. for violation
of various provisions of the liquor enforcement statute, were returned
by a grand jury impaneled, charged, and sworn by the Commonwealth's
attorney and not by a regular judge or a special judge of the court.
A special judge presided during part of the time, but vacated the
bench before the end of the session of the grand jury. In the absence
of a judge presiding the grand jury returned in the courtroom the several indictments in question. These indictments were received by the
clerk, who indorsed bail thereon and ordered bench warrants. The
orders showing the several steps mentioned were all entered by the
clerk without direction from and in the absence of any judge.
Mere technical defects in the constitution of the grand jury and
in the form of the indictment are held in most jurisdictions to be insufficient to quash the indictment returned. However where the preliminary proceedings in the impaneling, swearing, or charging are not
merely defective or irregular but are illegal and void, the indictment
returned is void. 6 Corpus Juris, pp. 1004-1005; Meiers v. State, 56 Ind.
336; Lindsay v. State, 24 Ohio, Cir. Ct. R. 1; Rianes v. State, 147 Ala.
691.
It seems that in a plea of abatement to an indictment, if objections
to the election and qualification of the jury are not made before going
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to trial thereon, the plea is insufficient. Dyer v. State, 79 Tenn (11 Lea.)
509; State v. Larkin, 11 Nev. 314.
The grand jury is formed under the direction of the court. Thayer
v. People, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 417. The judge of the court is the one upon
whom the duty rests to impanel and swear the jury. This duty is not
given to the Commonwealth's attorney.
An order of the court entered when there is no judge of the court
present or presiding is a nullity. An indictment found and returned
by a grand jury which was not duly impaneled and sworn by a judge,
or a special judge lawfully authorized to do so, is void. Such an indictment when so returned does not become valid by the orders that
may be entered showing its return and the indorsement of bail thereon
made by the clerk in the absence of the judge or without his authority.
Ky. St., sections 373 and 2250; Corn. v. Pulan, 3 Bush 47; Cricinal Code,
sections 119-121; Sublett v. Gardner, 144 Ky. 190; Muncy v. Gibsoz, 1S3
S. W. 964; Farrisv. Mathews, 149 Ky. 455; Meridth v. Corn., 201 Ky. 309.
H. H. G.
JUDGES-CoUNTY JUDGES HELD ENTITLED TO COIISSIONS ON

IONEYS

RiEcEIVED UNDELE TiE PROHimiTiON AOTS.-Section 1731, Ky. Statutes, al-

lows judges of county, quarterly, city or police courts, where the jur!sdiction is concurrent with circuit courts, to collect the same fees allowed by law to the circuit clerks in Commonwealth cases where the
services are similar. Section 1721 allows circuit clerks in Commonwealth cases to collect ten per cent of all fines levied, and section
2554a-41, Ky. Statutes gives quarterly, justices and police courts concurrent jurisdiction of all offenses, the punishment of which does not
c-:eed $300.00 and sixty days in jail. That this act applied to violations
of the prohibition law was decided in Lakes v. Goodloe, 195 Ky. 240.
Since 1895 clerks have been collecting ten per cent of all fines in
Commonwealth cases but it does not appear that county judges have
made any claim to the fees, probably because nothing of consequence
was collected by county judges prior to the passage of the prohibition
laws. But since the passage of this law, fines have increased and appellant seeks to collect commission on $1,500.00 collected by him in
this way.
It was argued that the intention of the legislature was that this
should be an extra compensation to circuit clerks for their services in
Commonwealth cases and that it was not intended for the benefit of
those whose services are compensated by the schedule of fees in section
1731. The court however was unable to agree to this contention, stating
that the intention of the statute was clear that county judges and
justices of the peace should be entitled to the same fees collected by
circuit clerks for similar services in courts of concurrent jurisdiction
in Commonwealth cases. The word fee is defined in Cochran's Law
Lexicon as "a recompense for official professional services," in C. J.,
volume 21, p. 1009, as "a charge or emolument or compensation for
particular services or acts, every kind of compensation allowed by law,"
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and the court was of opinion that these definitions were sufficiently
broad to include the commission awarded the clerk as a fee and it
must be applied to the other officers. Craig,Auditor of Public Accounts
E. B. C.
v. Shclton, 201 Ky. 790.
CourIs-HInwAY

CONTRACTORS

HELD LiABLE

TO

EAmPLOYEE

FOn

NEGLEMncE.--Deceased was killed while in the employment of appellants, state read contractors, throuhi the negligence of one of his
fellow employees. Appellants were at the time engaged in building
roads for the county, a governmental function, and they claimed nonliability on this ground: that they, as contractors to perform the governmental function, would not be liable for negligence to their em.
ployee, because the state or county doing the same wcrk would not be
liable.
The fact that the county or state would not be liable may be conceded (Coleman v. Esken, 111 Ky. 131; LeaveZl v. Western Kentucky
Asylum, 122 Ky. 213; Ketterer's Admr. v. State Board of Control, 131
Ky. 237; Moss v. Rowlett, 112 Ky. 121; Blue Grass Traction Co. v.
Grover, 135 Ky. 685, 123 S. W. 265; Schneider v. CahiZl, 127 S. W. 143;
Ockerman v. Woolward, 165 Ky. 752), but when an independent contractor, for a named consideration, takes it upon himself to do the work
of the municipality, the reason for the rule ceases. The reason for
the exemption is that if the public funds were to be diverted to the
payment of damage claims then the more important work of government which must be performed would be seriously impaired if not
totally destroyed. Now, it is a well known maxim of law that when a
reason for the rule ceases, the rule should cease al~o.
It has been held by this court that a contractor is not liable for
an injury occasioned by a defect in the road by reason of work being
done on the road by the contractor (Moss v. Rowlett, 112 Ky. 121;
Ockerman v. Woodward, 165 Ky. 752), but the case under consideration is different. It is a case of negligence of an employer towards an
employee, and the court stated that it had never held and could see
no reason for holding that a contractor who undertakes on his own account to do work for the county for a named consideration, using his
own materials and employing his own labor, should not be liable to an
employee for negligence to that employee causing his death.
The court has recognized this principle in two leading cases:
Jones & Co. v. Ferro Concrete Construction Co., 154 Ky. 47, and O'Connell Co. v. Telegraph Co., 162 Ky. 468; holding that a recovery could
be had for injury done to employee through negligence of an independent contractor, notwithstanding the contractor was in the employment of county, state or city and was engaged in government work.
E. B. C.
J. Harvey Vandivier & Sons v. Hardin's Admx., 201 Ky. 734.
R.umnoAns-FAILURE TO KrP PRoPrR LoKouT-Gnoss NEGLIGENCE.
-Appellee was crossing the tracks of the appellant at a public street
in her automobile when one of the wheels of her car dropped into a
leep hole between the rails. This caused the car to stop and the engine
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to "go dead." She was attempting to start the machine when she suddenly observed a train bearing down upon her a short distance away
and had time only to spring from the car to avoid personal injury.
The automobile was struck and demolished. Evidence showed that the
train was running at the rate of fifty miles an hour, that it failed to
give any signal of its approach and that if the engineer had kept a
lookout, the collision would not have occurred. Appellee had used
proper care in crossing the track.
The lower court held the appellant guilty of gross carelessness
and negligence and allowed appellee to recover the amount of loss
which she had incurred in her particular business by not having the
use of -the car.
It is held in every state either by virtue of decisions or upon -the
strength of statutory regulation that railroads are bound by duty to
maintain proper lookouts and give signals when their trains pass
dangerous crossings like the one in the principal case. Elliott on
Railroads, volume 4, section 115S, says: "The duty to give warning
signals on the approach of trains to crossings has become so well established that in most, if not all of the states, they are required by statutes. It has been hbld that whether required by statute or not, suitable warnings must be given to appraise the traveler of the presence
of the train." Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Sharp, 63 Fed. Rep. 532; Vandewater
v. N. Y. do. R. Co., 74 Hun. (N. Y.) 32; Cleveland, &c. R. Co. v. Nieles,
162 Ind. 646. He further says, "The maintenance by railroad companies
of lookouts, as their trains approach crossings even in the absence of
any statute or ordinance upon the subject, particularly where the crossing is unusually dangerous, is a duty that has been clearly established
and the omission to keep such lookouts has generally been held to constitute negligence. East Tenn., dc. R. Co. v. White, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 540
(where it was decided by virtue of a statute as follows: "The lookout
on locomotive must not only be in his place, but must be vigilant and
watchful. If he does not see what with reasonable vigilance he should
have seen, the company is in default for a failure to comply with the
provisions of the statute on the subject." Marcott v. Marquette, do. R.
Co., 47 Mich. 1.)
In regard to rate of speed in which the train is running, it can be
said in concurrence with authority that in the absence of statute or
ordinance, no rate of speed is negligence. Whether the rate used Is
negligent or not usually depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and the rate of speed when alleged as one of the grounds
for recovery may generally be shown with other circumstances as evidence of negligence. Massoth v. Del., do. Canal Co., 64 N. Y. 524; Louisville, do. R. Co. v. ,tammel, 126 Ind. 35.
The rate of speed in which the appellant's train was approaching
the appellee, in connection with the facts that it was nearing a public
and dangerous street crossing and that it was not under the care of a
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lookout, would appear to show clearly that the appellant was guilty of
negligence in the use of a great rate of "speed.
The case is in harmony with the general authority and decisions
that hold the railroad company in such cases is guilty of negligence.
0. & 0. Railway Co. v. Boren, 202 Ky. 348.
M. F.
OAimiEs-No LTABITY
m

0ronLoss OF PouLTRY
iN

CAR PARTLY LOADED.

-Appellants, poultry dealers, were, upon their application, furnished
an empty poultry car by the appellees, common carriers. The car was
placed in the appellees' yards where it was to be loaded by the appellants for shipment. At the end of the second day while, the car was
about two-thirds loaded, the doors of the car were locked by the appellants' agent, who kept the keys in his possession during the night
following. Between the time the car was locked and seven o'clock the
next morning, the car was broken into and approximately 2,000 pounds
of poultry stolen therefrom. There was no competent evidence given
or offered showing any negligence or failure of the appellees to use
ordinary care during the night.
The rule of law is well established in most jurisdictions that if
goods are merely placed in a railroad company's depot for the convenience of the consignor, and are not ready for shipment until the consignor has done something further to them, the railroad company is
not liable. Stapleton v. Grand Trunk By. Co., 133 Mich. 137, 94 N. W.
739. The fact that the goods were in the appellees' car instead of in
the open yards or in the depot would not create any greater liability.
. Numerous cases have held that the liability of a common carrier
does not begin until there has been a complete delivery of the goods
for immediate transportation with the knowledge and consent of the
carrier. Louisville & A. R. Co. v. United States-, 39 Ct. Cl. 405; Dunnington & Co. v. L. & X. R. 1?. Co., 153 Ky. 388; Nelson v. C. & 0. R. R?.
Co., 157 Ky. 256. However, the carrier's liability begins when it receives
freight for immediate shipment, and such liability is not dependant
upon the issuance of the bill of lading. Garner v. St. Louis, I. H. & i.
By. Co., 79 Ark. 353, 96 S. W. 187. There is no liability until the actual
bailment is made. Collier v. Swinney, 16 Mo. 484.
Assuming that the car had been completely loaded and was ready
for shipment, then in case the car and its contents were destroyed by
fire, or the car was broken into and the goods carried away by thieves,
it would seem to appear that the carriers would be liable. Cincinnati,
N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Go. v. Compton, 38 S. W. 220.
The liability of the carrier does not cease, when he is delivering
goods to the consignee, until the goods are placed on the side track.
Gulf & C. Ry. Co. v. Fuqua & Horton, 84 Miss. 490, and until notice of
the arrival of the goods is sent to the consignee. Chicago, R. I. & P.
Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 72 Ill. App. 105. Thus we see that the liability of the
carrier does not cease until notice of the arrival of the goods is sent to
the consignee, and it is only right and equitable that the liability of
the carrier should not begin until he has had notice from the consignor
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that the goods are ready for shipment. Peter Fox & Sons Co. v. L. &
H. H. G.
N. R. R. Co., 202 Ky. 187.
CAERIERS-PAsSENGEES WILFULLY AND MALIciousLY ASSAULTED, ENTITLED TO RECOVER BOTH

COAPENSATORY AND

PUNITIVE

DAMAGES.-Ap-

pellee was riding on a street car of appellant with one Lovejoy, who
was intoxicated, and the two had given little cause to the conductor o
become angry. The conductor told the motorman to call the police and
appellee, upon being notified of the intent to arrest him, proceeded to
get ofV the car 'when the motorman struck and beat him severely wi~h
a steel !ever. Appellant's witness testified that appellee had begun the
assault by kicking the motorman.
The lower court gives appellee both compensatory and punitive
damages.
That a carrier is liable for any ill-treatment to a passenger by its
servant is a legal doctrine that is too far settled in our courts to admit of doubt. Hutchinson in his treatise on Carriers, section 595, says,
"The passenger is entitled to respectful treatment from the carrier and
.
. As against the
his servants, and to protection by the carrier. .
assaults and violence of his servants, the passenger has the right to
claim an absolute protection, and the carrier will undoutedly be held
responsible for any unnecessary personal abuse or violence of which
they may be guilty in their treatment of the passenger whilst engaged
in discharging their duty." Goddard v. The Railway, 57 Me. 202; Sherley
v. Billings, 8 Bush (Ky.) 147; Stewart v. Railroad Co., 90 N. Y. 58S;
McKinley v. Railroad Co., 44 Iowa 314.
As to the liability of the carrier in exemplary damages for such
injury to a passenger, the courts in general, while not allowing recoveries on so liberal a basis as in the case of the award of compensatory damages, have almost universally held the carrier to answer in
punitive damages whenever it could be shown that the conduct of the
carrier's servant during the performance of the latter's duties of employment was divergent from and at variance with the protection which
the carrier is bound to afford each of its passengers. As Hutchinson
explains it, "Whenever this is the case the law allows another element
to enter into the compensation of the amount of damages, not because
the plaintiff is entitled to anything more than strict compensation, but
for the sake of the salutary effect which such examples may have in
deterring the carrier as well as others from the perpetration of similar
wrongs." (Hutchinson on Carriers, section 812.)
The grossness of the act of appellant's servant in this case established one of those circumstances where the court would be justified
in adding to the punishment of the appellant such exemplary damages
as would seem beneficial to strengthen in the conscience of the carrier
the understanding that such acts by its servants should be denounced
in the future.
In all these cases, however, where punitive damage is awarded, it
is proper for the court to instruct the jury to consider any provocation
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of the servant by the passenger in mitigation of the exemplary damage. Renfro v. Barlow, 131 Ky. 312 (where the jury was instructed
to consider provocation in mitigation of punitive damages but not
actual damages.) Louisville Ry. Co. v. Frick, 158 Ky. 450.
Nevertheless, the court is under no duty to instruct the jury in
regard to provocation unless this instruction has been requested or the
provocation has been pleaded. L. H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 144 Ky.
820. In the case under discussion, the kicking of the motorman by appellee may have been sufficient cause to show that the punitive damage
should have been mitigated. But in the absence of any request that an
instruction be given on this issue, it was not erroneous for the court
to submit no details on the question of provocation to the jury. Ohio
Valley Electric Railway Co. v. Webb, 202 Ky. 341.
M. F.
LnriATIox or AcTioNS-IEcovnMY AUST BE HAD UFO NEW PROMISE,
i MkDE ArrE BAR is CoLTEn.-Defendants were payees of a note and
discounted it at plaintiff's bank. After the maker had failed to pay,
the plaintiff relying on the defendants' promises to pay it, made after
the statutory period had run, let the debt drag for thirteen years after
the note matured before instituting suit on it. They based their action on the defendants' new promise to pay. Defendants pleaded the
statute of limitations. As to that plea, the court held that the statute
of limitations was a personal plea only and was available to no one but
the obligor. (Hyden v. Oalames, 161 Ky. 593; Baker v. Begley, 1.55 Ky.
234.) Further, that the new promise if made after the statutory period
had run could not revive the original obligation, which must then be
regarded as dead, but the action must be brought on the new promise.
(Carrs L'xor. v. Robinson, 8 Bush 269; Gilmore v. Green, 14 Bush 772;
McCrackcn County v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344). Defendant
then contended that the interest should run only from the date of the
new promise, but the court said that as the new promise created a new
obligation, it could be restricted to any part of the original debt, but
when not so restricted an unconditional promise to pay naturally includes the interest which is an integral part of the debt and is carried
with it unless segregated by agreement. Wherefore, judgment was given
for plaintiff for the amount of the note with interest from date. West
v. W. T. B. Williams & Sons, Bankers.
E. B. C.
DivoncE-nUIsDicTIoN or APPEi&TE COURT or DIVORCE DECREES.Appellant, the husband of appellee sued for divorce charging his wife
with conduct proving her to be unchaste. She denied the charge, and
by counterclaim sought a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman
treatment. Judgment was rendered for the wife, and both parties .ppeal from the allowances for alimony.
By sedtion 950, Kentucky Statutes, it is provided that no appeal
as a matter of right can be taken for the recovery of money or personal
property if the value in controversy be less than $500.00, nor to reverse a judgment granting a divorce. Since the passage of this statute
it has been uniformily held in Kentucky that the appellate court has
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no jurisdiction to reverse a decree of the chancellor granting a divorce.
On the other hand it is equally well settled that the court can review
the evidence and it is satisfied that no alimony should have been given
it can set aside the decree so far as concerns the question of alimony.
Axton v. Axton, 182 Ky. 286; AIuxier v. Auxier, 151 Ky. 504; Steep v.
Steep, 178 Ky. 337; Phelps v. Phelps, 176 Ky. 456; Whitney v. Whitney,
7 Bush 520.
In Auxier v. Auxier it is held that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to review a judgment granting a divorce even though it is contended that the lower court in granting the divorce acted without jurisdiction, and in Irwin v. Irwin, 105 Ky. 632, the court says:
"But even if we concede the contention of the appellee that the
ground of divorce relied on in the supplemental petition is a status and
did not begin to exist until the first whole day of its existence, to-wit,
the eleventh qay of July, 1892, and that the supplemental petition was
prematurely filed, it does not seem to us a question of any importance
on this appeal as section 950, Kentucky Statutes, provides that no appeal shall be taken to the Court of Appeals to reverse a judgment
granting a divorce. The judgment of the chancellor on this question
is a finality, and can not be reviewed here."
In Barrettv. Barrett, 11 K. L. R. 287, and in Ross v. Ross, 11 K. L.
R. 306, the court refused to reverse a judgment granting a divorce
even though the court erred in dismissing the husband's petition, as the
effect of the judgment was to free him from the bonds of matrimony
just as effectually as if his petition had been sustained.
The principal and only reason for the statute was the inconvenience
that might result from annulling a decree of divorce after one of the
divorced parties had married. In Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana. 181,
the court holds that it does not feel authorized to limit the application
of the statute to one class of decrees for divorce, but that it is bound
to apply it to all divorces decreed by a court of equity in this state.
It is, however, setled in Kentucky that an appeal lies from a decree
refusing a divorce. Wesley v. Wesley, 181 Ky. 135; Parker v. Parker,
104 S. W. 1028; Goodpaster v. Goodpaster, 102 S. W. 324. The reason
is obvious. The purpose of the statute is to allow divorced parties to
remarry without waiting two or three years-!or the decision of the
appellate court. When a divorce is refused, the paries can not legally
marry, and there is no reason to apply the statute.
In Ohio no appeal is allowed except from an order dismissing the
petition without a final hearing or a final order of judgment or from
an order restraining the husband from disposing of his property pending divorce proceedings. Petersine v. Thomas, 28 Ohio State 596. Rhode
Island has a statute similar to the Kentucky Statute and a few other
states by statutory or constitutional provision have denied this power
to the appellate court. Hertel v. Fertel, 202 Kentucky 422.
J. H.
DIVORCE-HUSBAND AND Wrrn-Do.icmmm-Appellee and appellant
were married in February, 1919. Less than a year later appellant with
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her husband's consent attended a church convention in a nearby city.
Arriving at her home on her return, appellant found it locked; forcing
an entrance, she discovered that her personal belongings had been removed. An explanation of the situation is shown by the following extracts from a letter written by appellee to appellant: "I have secured
for your use a furnished room;" "ready for your occupancy;" "I have
arranged for your meals;" and "I have instructed that it (appellant's
furniture) be held or disposed of as you direct." Appellant, however,
continued to reside in the former home, repeatedly attempting to induce appellee to return to it. Upon his refusal to do so she on February 13, 1920, filed suit for maintenance, alleging cruelty and abandonment on part of appellee. March 9, 1920, appellee filed his answer
and counterclaim, alleging abandonment by appellant in refusing to
proceed to the rooms he had rented for her, and filing a copy of the
letter to appellant above abstracted. The question whether the refusal
of the wife to follow her husband to his new domicile is desertion on
the part of the wife is a comparatively new one and practically every
case cited under this issue has been determined in the present century.
The general rule as to the right of the husband to determine the
family domicile is settled. The right of a husband to change his residence and the obligation of the wife to follow him is undoubted. Ca dwell v. Caldwell, 70 Pa. Super. Court 332. Refusal of the wife to accompany her husband to a domicile selected by him is an abandonment
and if continued for the statutory period becomes ground for divorcea
Winkles v. Powell, 55 So. 536, 173 Ala. 46. The husband is the head of
the household, nominally at'least, and has the right to fix and choose
the domicile and the husband is not guilty of desertion where he simply
removes the domicile from one place to another. Mitchell v. Mitchell,
185 N. W. 62, 193 Ia. 153.
It is the wife's duty to live with her husband and to go wherever
he provides a home and refusal to do so without jurisdiction constitutes
desertion. Coleman v. Coleman, 164 Ky. 709. When the husband establishes a new domicile and in good faith urges his wife to live with him
there, her refusal to accept, if without sufficient reason, amounts to
"desertion." Roberson v. Roberson, 169 Pac. 333, 41 Nev. 276. It is only
when the husband has established a new domicile which is a reasonable
place of living and in good faith has offered the new abode to his wife
and she without sufficient cause has refused to comply with his selection that a cause of action for divorce arises. Bibb v. Bibb, 179 Pac.
214, 39 Cal. App. Rep. 406. Though a husband has the legal right to
determine the place of abode of the family and the wife must submit to
his decision, such power must be exercised in a reasonable and just
manner and cannot be exercised arbitrarily, nor used as a means of
procuring dissolution of the marital reIation. Hall v. Hall, 71 S. E.
103, 69 W. Va. 175.
Some states seem to determine the question of desertion according to whether the husband has requested the wife to follow him and
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furnished her with the ncessary money for removal. Where the husband establishes a new home and requests his wife to follow him and
furnishes her with the means with which to travel and she declines to
take up the residence with him, he is not guilty of deserting his wife.
Roby v. Roby, 77 Pac. 213, 10 Idaho 139. Where the husband moved
from Washingon, D. C., to Idaho, it was held that the court was justified in finding that the wife was guilty of desertion, tho the husband
did not send the wife money with which to travel from Washington to
Idaho. The wife had not expressed any willingness to go to Idaho nor
suggested in any way that she was lacking in funds. Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 185 N. W. 62, 193 Ia. 153. While it is the duty of the wife to
submit to her husband's choice of a family domicile, she is not bound
to follow him unless it is his wish that she do so and if he does not request her to accompany him, she is not guilty of desertion. Collett v.
Collett, 157 S. W. 90, 170 Mo. App. 590.
Kentucky in a few well considered cases on the point adopts and
follows a broader, more equitable view. It is the duty of the wife to
accept such residence as the husband may select without unwarranted
parsimony or stubbornness on his part. Klein v. Klein, 29 Ky. L. R.
1042; Clubb v. Clubb, 23 Ky. L. R. 650. The husband possesses the prerogative to select the domicile in which he and his wife shall reside
and, under ordinary and proper circumstances, this right is practically
arbitrary, but he must act in good faith and be sincere and fair in all
transactions relating thereto, and if so, the failure of the wife to accept
the domicile provided may be interpreted as abandonment, but the
abode chosen must be commensurate with their past method of living
or made necessary by misfortune. Watkins v. Watkins, 202 Ky. 141.
L.C.
CARnIRs-CARRIER's LIABILITY FOR IvJURY TO PAssEmmuu ENTERING
WAITING Room Two HoUns BEFORE TRIN TImE-DUTY OF CARRIER TO
MAiNTAIN DEPOT IN SAFE CoxmDION, NOT CONFINED TO PASSENGERiS.--Appellee had purchased a six monhs' family ticket from appellant. On
the occasion in question, appellee entered appellant's depot two hours
before the scheduled departure of her train. In seeking a seat in the
open and crowded waiting room, appellee fell thru a hole in the floor
and was injured.
Was appellee a passenger? If not, was she a licensee or an invitee?
The liability of the railroad depends upon the answer to these questions.
If a person goes upon the premises of a carrier, into a station, etc.,
with an intention, in good faith, of becoming a passenger, he occupies,
ordinarily, the staus of a passenger, provided his coming upon the
premises is within a reasonable time before that at which the conveyance of the carrier on which passage is to be taken is scheduled to
depart. 4 R. C. L., section 491; Heinlein v. Boston and P. R. Co., 147
Mass. 137; Fremont E. and M. R. Co. v. Hegblad, 72 Neb. 773; Phillips
v. So. Ry. Co., 124 N. 0. 123; Abbot v. Ore. R. Co., 46 Ore. 549; Kidwell
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v. C. and 0. R. Co., 71 W. Va. 664. One becomes a passenger on a railroad when he puts himself into the care of the railroad company to be
transported under a contract, and is received and accepted as such by
the company. There is hardly ever any formal act of delivery of one's
person into the care of the carrier, or of acceptance by the carrier of
one who presents himself for transportation, and so the existence of the
relation of passenger and carrier, is commonly to be implied from the
circumstances. The question is whether the person has presented himself in readiness to be carried under such circumstances in reference
to time, place, manner, and condition, that the railroad company must
be deemed to have accepted him as a passenger. Webster v. Fitchburg
R. Co., 161 Mass. 298. The purchase of a ticket does not make one a
passenger unless he comes under the charge of the carrier and is accepted for carriage by virtue of it. I. C. R. Co. v. O'Keefe, 168 Ill. 115.
It is his coming to the station within a reasonable time before with the
intention to take the next train that creates the relation of passenger.
Phillips v. So. By., 124 N. C. 123.
As to what constitutes a reasonable time depends, in the absence of
statutory provision, upon the circumstances and is usually a question
for the jury. Where, however, by statute or rule a reasonable time is
fixed during which a station must be open, that time will be regarded
as the reasonable time within which the intending passenger may be
at the station before the departure of his train, and enjoy the rights
and privileges of a passenger. 4 R. C. L., section 491. Ky. Stats., section 784, requires a railroad company to keep its ticket office and waiting room open thirty minutes immediately preceding the scheduled
time of departure of regular passenger trains. A traveler went to the
station five hours before her train was due and was assaulted. Under
the statute the court held that it was the duty of the carrier to provide facilities for intending passengers within a reasonable time before
the departure of its trains; that thirty minutes was a reasonable time;
and that by coming to the station five hours before the scheduled time
of departure of the train plaintiff did not become a passenger; that
there was no obligation upon the railroad to furnish accommodations
for the entertainment for an indefinite length of time to those who contemplate in the future becoming its passengers; that there was no invitation, either express or implied until within thirty minutes before
train time; and that consequently it owed no duty to plaintiff other or
different from that owing to any ordinary person. I. C. B. R. Co. v.
Laloge, 109, 896. One who had arrived at a station two hours earlier
and was still using the company's tracks was held no longer a passenger. L. and N. R7.R. Co. v. Bays' Admr., 142 Ky. 400. From such
citations it will be seen that appellee was not a passenger.
While the carrier may be liable in many cases to persons not presenting themselves for transportation at a proper place and in a proper
manner, and therefore not to be regarded as passengers, yet such liability must depend upon the rule as to negligence toward mere licensees
L. J.-6
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or trespassers. 4 R. C. L., section 499. A railroad company as a carrier
of passengers must provide adequate station accommodations and safeguards where it usually takes on and puts off passengers and it is
bound to keep its station in a safe condition and failure to perform
its duty in this respect will render it liable to those going on the
premises in response to the company's invitation and suffering injury
thru the carrier's neglect and who are themselves without fault. 4 R.
C. L., section 641. It has been held that such liability extends to those
coming either to assist outgoing or greet incoming passengers. Union
Depot and R. Co. v. Londoner, 50 Colo. 22; Ala. and Great So. P. Co. v.
Godfrey, 156 Ala. 202; Fremont E. and M. R. Co. v. Hegblad, 72 Neb.
773. As a general rule railroad tracks and rights of way, except at
public crossings or at public streets and highways, are exclusively railroad property and all persons who go upon the tracks or right of way,
except at such places, without the express or implied invitation so to
do, are trespassers or licensees, and must take such premises as they
find them and the company is under no duty or obligation to keep the
premises in a safe condition for such use A person is not a trespasser
or a mere licensee, however, who goes upon the station premises, or approaches thereto, upon business connected with the railroad company.
In such cases, his going thereon is held to be express or implied invitation of the railroad company and the company must keep the places
to which he is thus invited in a reasonably safe condition for such use.
L. and X. R. R. Co. v. Schneider, 174 Ky. 730. In the instant case, what
was appellee's business with the railroad two hours before her train
time?
Citing L. and Y. R. R. Co. v. Schneider, supra, and distinguishing
the present case from I. C. B. R. Go. v. Laloge, supra, and L. and X. R.
R. Co. v. Bays' Admr., supra, the court says: "Appellee went to the
station to become a passenger on one of the company's trains. The
waiting room was open. This was an invitation to enter. She entered
and was injured by reason of the hole in the floor, and there can be no
doubt of the company's liability unless she was guilty of contributory
negligence, which, we conclude, was a question for the jury." Evidently, the court reaches the conclusion that appellee was an invitee.
Or, support might be found for the court's conclusion in the theory
that the general public are entitled to find safe platforms, etc., if they
go on the carrier's property, whether they have business there or not.
It has been said that depot grounds are quasi public. 4 R. C. L., section
643. Railroad depot grounds and passenger houses are quasi public
and a person going to such houses and passing over such depot grounds
in a proper manner, is not a trespasser, but where persons go upon or
pass over grounds connected with railroad depots, they are presumed
to know that the place is dangerous and hence are required to use
care and prudence commensurate with the known danger of the place.
Servants of a railroad company, knowing the enhanced danger at depot grounds on account of persons constantly passing and repassing
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are required to exercise a greater degree of care and prudence for the
preservation of life and limb than at other places where persons have
no right to be and the employees have no right to expect them. 1. C.
B. R. Co. v. Hammer, 72 Ill. 347. The majority rule seems to be otherwise. A person who goes to a station house and on the platform, not
for purpose of any business, or to meet expected friends, or to see others
depart, but as a mere spectator, for his own pleasure and convenience,
is there at his own risk and peril and cannot recover damages for
personal injuries received in consequence of a defective platform. Burbank v. I. C. R. R. Co., 42 Ia. Ann. 1156; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Minnix,
L. C.
202 Ky. 472.

